Aapka Consultant Judgment Series- In this series, we are providing case analysis of Landmark Judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
Sareetha Vs. T. Venkata Subbaiah
AIR1983AP356
Hon’ble Judges/Coram: P.A. Choudary, J.
Decided On: July 1st, 1983
FACTS:-
Sareetha, a well-known actress of the South Indian film industry was alleged to have been given in marriage to Venkata Subbaiah at Tirupathi on December 13th, 1975. Immediately thereafter, they were separated from each other and have been living apart from each other for more than five years. Venkata Subbaiah filed for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter “the Act”) at the sub-court, Cuddapah. It was the contention of Sareetha that the Sub-Court, Cuddapah had no jurisdiction over the matter, as the marriage took place at Tirrupathi and the couple last resided together at Madras. It was Venkata’s contention that the couple lived together in Cuddapah for six months and thereafter went to Madras and lived there with Sareetha’s parents for some time. The Sub-Court overruled Sareetha’s preliminary objection, and Sareetha filed a Civil Revision Petition against the order of the Sub-Court.
ISSUE:-
Whether Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act runs counter to Part III of the Constitution?
JUDGMENT:-
Venkata contended that their stay at Cuddapah for six months was immediately after marriage and Cuddapah was the place they last resided together within the meaning of the Act. On the other hand, Sareetha contended that they last lived together at Madras and thus the Cuddapah Court had no jurisdiction to try the application of Venkata Subbaiah.
Two questions were raised before the Court. Firstly, did the parties live at Cuddapah immediately after marriage? Secondly, if they did, could the Madras residence supersede the Cuddapah residence? The Subordinate Judge found that it was Sareetha’s pleading that the Madras residence amounted in law to have superseded the Cuddapah residence. However, the Cuddapah residence was not denied by Sareetha. The Subordinate Judge found that the Madras residence was not sufficient to displace the Cuddapah residence. Thus, he held that the Cuddapah Court had jurisdiction to try the application filed by Venkat Subbaiah.
The Court held that the Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the parties lived at the house of Venkata at Cuddapah as Venkata Subbaiah had specifically pleaded this and Sareetha failed to specifically deny this averment.
The Court looked into Clause (iii) of Section 19 of the Act, which speaks of the place where the parties to the marriage last resided together. The Court observed that in light of the dictionary definition of the word “residence” temporary place of residence or a casual place of stay cannot be included in it. In Clause (iii), the residence being spoken of is joint residence. Clause (iii) refers to a place where the husband and wife lived permanently or for a sufficiently long period of time. In other words, it refers to the matrimonial home of the parties to the marriage.
The Court observed that the ordinarily accepted descriptions of the word ‘reside’ in matrimonial cases would exclude places where the husband and the wife stayed only temporarily. More depends on the particular facts of each case and less on the meaning of the words. Venkata had a permanent house at Cuddapah. It is that place that Venkata and Sareetha went immediately after marriage and stayed there for six months. They thus made Cuddapah their matrimonial home. Thus, it is Cuddapah alone that can be called their matrimonial home and their last place of residence within the meaning of Clause (iii) of Section 19.
Sareetha also challenged the constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Act in light of Articles 14, 91 and 21 of the Indian Constitution inasmuch as the restitution of conjugal rights offends the guarantee to life, personal liberty, human dignity and decency. The decree for restitution of conjugal rights to be granted under Section 9 of the Act is to enforced under Order 21 Rules 32 and 33 by applying financial sanctions against the disobeying party. Additionally, a Court can enforce a decree through its contempt powers.
Conjugal rights connote two ideas. (a) “The right which husband and wife have to each other’s society” and (b) “marital intercourse.” Sexual cohabitation is an inseparable ingredient of a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. Relief of restitution of conjugal rights enables the decree holder to have sexual cohabitation with an unwilling party. A decree of restitution of conjugal rights thus enforced offends the inviolability of the body and the mind subjected to the decree and offends the integrity of such a person and invades the marital privacy and domestic intimacies of such a person. The coercive act of the State compelling sexual cohabitation therefore must be regarded as a great constraint and torture imposed on the mind of the unwilling party.
The question was whether Section 9 runs counter to Part III of the Constitution. The section was first examined in light of Article 21. “Life” occurring in Article 21 has spiritual significance. This was accepted by the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and Govind v. State of M.P. Both judgments held Article 21 to be the source for the protection of personal liberty and life in the elevated sense. In Govind’s case, it was held that Article 21 encompasses the right to privacy and human dignity. Using various definitions of “privacy”, the Court found that the right to privacy is flagrantly violated by a decree of restitution of conjugal rights.
The Court used the propositions from the American Supreme Court to establish the proposition that reproductive choice is fundamental to an individual’s right to privacy. During a time when the wife is contemplating an action for divorce, the use and enforcement of Section 9 of the Act can irretrievably alter her position by bringing about forcible conception. The Court concluded that there are no overwhelming State interests that would justify the sacrificing of the individual’s constitutional right to privacy.
Restitution of conjugal rights is a barbarous and savage remedy, violating the right to privacy and human dignity guaranteed by Article 21. Constitutional validity of Section 9 was also denied as it failed the traditional classification test and the test of minimum rationality required of any State Law. By treating the wife and the husband who are inherently unequal as equals, Section 9 offends the rule of equal protection of laws. Section 9 is therefore violative of Article 14 and liable to be struck down. Section 9 promotes no legitimate public purpose based on any conception of the general good. Section 9 is therefore arbitrary and void as offending Article 14.
HELD:-
The Civil Revision Petition was allowed. Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was declared null and void.
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