Aapka Consultant Judgment Series- In this series, we are providing case analysis of Landmark Judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr.
AIR1996SC309, (1995)6SCC194, 1996CriLJ381
Hon’ble Judges/Coram: Dr. A.S. Anand and M.K. Mukherjee, JJ.
Date of Decision: 12.10.1995
FACTS:-
Two appeals have been heard together in this matter as they arise out of one and the same incident. On July 29, 1988, Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, lodged a complaint with the Inspector General of Police, alleging commission of offences under Sections 341, 342, 352, 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC” for short) by Mr. K.P.S. Gill, the Director General of Police, Punjab on July 18, 1988 at a dinner party. Treating that complaint as the First Information Report (FIR) a case was registered by the Central Police Station, Sector 17, Chandigarh and investigation was taken up. Thereafter on November 22, 1988, her husband Mr. B.R. Bajaj, lodged a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate for the same offences, alleging, inter alia, that Mr. Gill being a high-ranking Police Officer the Chandigarh Police had neither arrested him in connection with the case registered by the Police on his wife’s complaint nor conducted investigation in a fair and impartial manner. On receipt of the complaint the Chief Judicial Magistrate transferred it to a Judicial Magistrate for disposal and the latter, in view of the fact that an investigation by the Police was in progress in relation to the same offences, called for a report from the Investigating Officer in accordance with Section 210 of Code Criminal Procedure (“Cr. P.C.” for short). In the meantime – on December 16, 1988 to be precise -Mr. Gill moved the High Court by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. for quashing the F.I.R. and the complaint. On that petition an interim order was passed staying the investigation into the F.I.R. lodged by Mrs. Bajaj, but not the proceedings initiated on the complaint of Mr. Bajaj. Resultantly, the learned Judicial Magistrate proceeded with the complaint case and examined the complainant and the witnesses produced by him.
Thereafter, Mr. Bajaj moved an application before the learned Magistrate for summoning Mr. Y.S. Ratra, an I.A.S. Officer of the Government of Punjab and Mr. J.F. Rebeiro, Advisor to the Governor of Punjab for being examined as witnesses on his behalf and for producing certain documents, ‘which was allowed. Instead of appearing personally, the above two Officer sought for exemption from appearance; and the District Attorney, after producing the documents, filed an application claiming privilege under Sections123/124 of the Evidence Act in respect of them. The learned Magistrate rejected the prayer of the above two officers and also rejected, after going through the documents, the claim of privilege, being of the opinion that the documents did not concern the affairs of the State. Assailing the order of the learned Magistrate rejecting the claim of privilege, the State of Punjab filed a Criminal Revision Petition which was allowed by the High Court by its Order dated January 24, 1989. The petition earlier filed by Mr. Gill under Section 482 Cr.P.C. came up for hearing before the High Court thereafter and was allowed by its order dated May 29, 1989 and both the F.I.R. and the complaint were quashed. The above two orders of the High Court are under challenge in these appeals at the instance of Mr. and Mrs. Bajaj.
ISSUE:-
- What are the circumstances and categories of cases under which the High Court can quash an F.I.R. or a complaint in exercise of its powers under Article 226of the Constitution of India or under Section 482P.C?
JUDGMENT:-
In order to decide under what circumstances and in what categories of cases the High Court can quash an F.I.R. or a complaint in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court referred to the decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992CriLJ527 which laid down the following categories of cases, with a note of caution, by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice:
- Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
- Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
- Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
- Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
- Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
- Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
- Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
Coming back to this particular case, court said that we have to ascertain whether the case presented before us comes under categories (1), (3) and (5) above. Besides, it raises the applicability of Section 95 IPC. Since the answers to the above three questions have to be found out from the F.I.R. itself court looked into the contents thereof which are summarily read thus:
- Around 10 P.M. Dr. Chutani and Shri Gill walked across to and sal in the ladies’ circle;
- Bajaj, who was then talking to Mrs. Bijlani and Mrs. Bhandari, was requested by Mr. Gill to come and sit near him as he wanted to talk to her about something;
- Responding to his such request when Mrs. Bajaj went to sit in a chair next to him Mr. Gill suddenly pulled that chair close to his chair;
- Feeling a bit surprised, when she put that chair at its original place and was about to sit down, Mr. Gill again pulled his chair closer;
- Realising something was wrong she immediately left the place and went back to sit with the ladies;
- After about 10 minutes Shri Gill came and stood in front of her so close that his legs were about 4″ from her knees;
- He then by an action with the crook of his finger asked her to “get up immediately” and come along with him;
- When she strongly objected to his behavior and asked him to go away from there he repeated his earlier command which shocked the ladies present there;
- Being apprehensive and frightened she tried to leave the place but could not as he had blocked her way;
- Finding no other alternative when she drew her chair back and turned backwards, he slapped her on the posterior in the full presence of the ladies and guests.
After analyzing the facts of the case and relevant provisions of law Court said that the High Court has flagrantly disregarded the settled principle of law that at the stage of quashing an FIR or complaint the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. Of course as has been pointed out in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) an F.I.R. or a complaint may be quashed if the allegations made therein are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but the High Court has not recorded such a finding, obviously because on the allegations in the FIR it was not possible to do so.
Since at the time of taking cognizance the Court has to exercise its judicial discretion, it necessarily follows that if in a given case – as the present one – the complainant, as the person aggrieved raises objections to the acceptance of a police report which recommends discharge of the accused and seeks to satisfy the Court that a case for taking cognizance was made out, but the Court overrules such objections, it is just and desirable that the reasons therefore be recorded. Necessity to give reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the issues before the Court needs no emphasis. Reasons introduce clarity and minimise chances of arbitrariness. That necessarily means that recording of reasons will not be necessary when the Court accepts such police report without any demur from the complainant.
HELD:-
For the reasons as aforesaid court held that the High Court has committed a gross error of law in quashing the FIR and the complaint. Accordingly, court set aside the impugned judgment and dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Gill in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Further, Court directed the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh to take cognizance upon the police report in respect of the offences under Sections 354 and 509 IPC and try the case himself in accordance with law.
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