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S.P. Sampath Kumar & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.
AIR1987SC386; (1987)1SCC124; [1987]1SCR435
Hon’ble Judges/Coram: P.N. Bhagwati, C.J., Ranganath Misra, V. Khalid, G.L. Oza and M.M. Dutt, JJ.
Concurring Judgment: V. Khalid, G.L. Oza and M.M. Dutt, JJ.
Date of Decision: 09.12.1986
FACTS:-
The challenge has been raised to the vires of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution and the other connected matters have been referred to the Constitution Bench for adjudication. Indisputably the Act has been framed within the ambit of Article 323 A which was brought into the Constitution by the Forty-Second Amendment Act in 1976. In exercise of power vested under Section 1(3) of the Act, the Central Government appointed 1.11.1985 as the date from which the Act would come into force. Thereupon Sampat Kumar and others (W.P. 12460 of 1985) moved this Court and the connected matters were brought before this Court or different High Courts which have since been transferred to this Court to be analogously heard. On 31.10.1985 a Division Bench of this Court gave certain interim directions including stay of transfer of the pending applications under Article 32 which were liable to be transferred to the Tribunal and also for continuance of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 in regard to disputes covered under the Act notwithstanding the bar provided in Section 28. In the writ applications as presented the main challenge was to the abolition of the Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 in respect of specified service disputes. Challenge was also raised against the taking away of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227.
ISSUE:-
Whether bar of jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226 and 227 affects the provision for judicial review?
JUDGMENT:-
The right to move the High Court in its writ jurisdiction unlike the one under Article 32 is not a fundamental right. Yet, the High Courts, have in exercise of the power of judicial review played a definite and positive role in the matter of preservation of fundamental and other rights and in keeping administrative action under reasonable control. In these thirty-six years following the enforcement of the Constitution, not only has India’s population been more than doubled but also the number of litigations before the courts including the High Courts has greatly increased. As the pendency in the High Courts increased and soon became the pressing problem of backlog, the nation’s attention came to be bestowed on this aspect. Ways and means to relieve the High Courts of the load began to engage the attention of the Government at the center as also in the various States. As early as 1969, a Committee was setup by the Central Government under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Shah of this Court to make recommendations suggesting ways and means for effective, expeditious and satisfactory disposal of matters relating to service disputes of Government servants as it was found that a sizable portion of pending litigations related to this category. The Committee recommended the setting up of an independent Tribunal to handle the pending cases before this Court and the High Courts. While this report was still engaging the attention of Government, the Administrative Reforms Commission also took note of the situation and recommended the setting up of Civil Services Tribunals to deal with appeals of Government servants against disciplinary action. In certain States, Tribunals of this type came into existence and started functioning. But the Central Government looked into the matter further as it transpired that the major chunk of service litigation related to matters other than disciplinary action. In May 1976, a Conference of Chief Secretaries of the States discussed this problem. Then came the Forty-Second Amendment of the Constitution bringing in Article 323 A which authorised Parliament to provide by law “for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connexion with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any Corporation owned or controlled by the Government.” As already stated this Article envisaged exclusion of the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in Clause (1). Though the Constitution now contained the enabling power, no immediate steps were taken to set up any Tribunal as contemplated by Article 323A.
Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in service matters and its propriety as also validity have thus to be examined in the background indicated above. It has already been seen that judicial review by this Court is left wholly unaffected and thus there is a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can be brought for determination or rectification. Thus exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court does not totally bar judicial review. This Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1981] 1 SCR 206 case did point out that “effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review” can be made by Parliament. Thus it is possible to set up an alternative institution in place of the High Court for providing judicial review. The debates and deliberations spread over almost two decades for exploring ways and means for relieving the High Courts of the load of backlog of cases and for assuring quick settlement of service disputes in the interest of the public servants as also the country cannot be lost sight of while considering this aspect. It has ‘not been disputed before the Court and perhaps could not have been that the Tribunal under the scheme of the Act would take over a part of the existing backlog and a share of the normal load of the High Courts. The Tribunal has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemental to the High Court in the scheme of administration of justice. To provide the Tribunal as an additional forum from where parties could go to the High Court would certainly have been a retrograde step considering the situation and circumstances to meet which the innovation has been brought about. Thus barring of the jurisdiction of the High Court can indeed not be a valid ground of attack. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the substitute institution the Tribunal must be a worthy successor of the High Court in all respects. That is exactly what this Court intended to convey when it spoke of an alternative mechanism in Minerva Mills’ case.
It is necessary to bear in mind that service matters which are removed from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act for adjudication involve questions of interpretation and applicability of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. These questions require for their determination not only judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law. It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions should have same modicum of legal training and judicial experience because we find that some of these questions are so difficult and complex that they baffle the minds of even trained Judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The presence of the administrative member would provide input of practical experience in the functioning of the services and add to the efficiency of the Administrative Tribunal but the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input or not giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal as compared to the High Court.
It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal should be a real substitute of the High Court not only in form and demure but in content and de facto. As was pointed out in Minerva’s Mills, the alternative arrangement has to be effective and efficient as also capable of upholding the constitutional limitations. Article 16 of the Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Article 15 bars discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. The touch-stone of equality enshrined in Article 14 is the greatest of guarantees for the citizen. Centring around these articles in the Constitution a service jurisprudence has already grown in this country. Under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act all the powers of the Courts except those of this Court in regard to matters specified therein vest in the Tribunal either Central or State. Thus the Tribunal is the substitute of the High Court and is entitled to exercise the powers thereof.
That apart it is further held that if the Administrative Tribunal is to be an equally effective and efficacious substitution for the High Court on the basis of which alone the impugned Act can be sustained, there must be a permanent or if there is not sufficient work, then a Circuit Bench of the Administrative Tribunal at every place where there is a seat of the High Court.
HELD:-
The Administrative Tribunal being a substitute of the High Court had the necessary jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate upon all disputes relating to service matters including the power to deal with all question pertaining to the constitutional validity or otherwise of such laws as offending Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.
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