Aapka Consultant Judgment Series- In this series, we are providing case analysis of Landmark Judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu
1994 SCC (6) 632; 1995 AIR SC 264; [1994]Supp4SCR353
Hon’ble Judges/Coram: B.P. Jeevan Reddy and S.C. Sen, JJ.
Date of Judgment: 07-10-1994
FACTS:-
Auto Shankar, a convicted prisoner wrote his autobiography running into 300 pages which sets out the close nexus between the prisoner and several IAS, and other officers, some of whom were indeed his partners in several crimes. The autobiography was handed over by him to his wife with the knowledge and approval of the jail authorities, for being delivered to his advocate, who then handed it over to the petitioners’ to get it published in their magazine ‘Nakkheeran’. Before commencing the serial publication of the autobiography in their magazine, the petitioner announced in the Issue dated May 21, 1994 that very soon the magazine would be coming out with the sensational life history of Auto Shankar. This announcement sent shock waves among several police and prison officials who were afraid that their links with the condemned prisoner would be exposed. They forced the said prisoner, by applying third degree methods, to write letters addressed to the second respondent (Inspector General of Prisons) and the first petitioner requesting that his life-story should not be published in the magazine. Certain correspondence also ensued between the petitioners and the prison authorities in this connection. Ultimately, the Inspector General of Prisons (R-2) wrote the impugned letter dated June 15, 1994 to the first petitioner claiming the autobiography to be false, that publication was against prison rules, and threatened legal action if they proceeded with publishing. Fearing reprisals from the police, given that the prisoner described his links with a number of high officials, the petitioners sought issuance of an appropriate, writ, order or direction under Article 32 of the Constitution, restraining the respondents from taking any action as contemplated in the second respondent’s communication dated June 15, 1994 and further restraining them from interfering with the publication of the autobiography of the condemned prisoner, Auto Shankar, in their magazine. Since neither Auto Shankar nor his wife – nor his counsel are made parties to this writ petition, the Supreme Court proceeded on the assumption that the said prisoner has neither written his autobiography nor has he authorised the petitioners to publish the same in their magazine, as asserted by the writ petitioners. It was however clarified by the court that it is only an assumption for the purpose of this writ petition and not a finding of fact. The said disputed question may have to be gone into, as and when necessary, before an appropriate court or forum, as the case may be.
ISSUES:-
On the pleadings in this petition, following questions arise:
- Whether a citizen of this country can prevent another person from writing his life story or biography? Does such unauthorised writing infringe the citizen’s right to privacy? Whether the freedom of press guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) entitles the press to publish such unauthorised account of a citizen’s life and activities and if so to what extent and in what circumstances? What are the remedies open to a citizen of this country in case of infringement of his right to privacy and further in case such writing amounts to defamation?
- Whether the Government can maintain an action for its defamation?
- Whether the Government has any legal authority to impose prior restraint on the press to prevent publication of material defamatory of its officials? and
- Whether the public officials, who apprehend that they or their colleagues may be defamed, can impose a prior restraint upon the press to prevent such publication?
- Whether the prison officials can prevent the publication of the life story of a prisoner on the ground that the prisoner being incarcerated and thus not being in a position to adopt legal remedies to protect his rights, they are entitled to act on his behalf?
JUDGMENT:-
The right to privacy as an independent and distinctive concept originated in the field of Tort law, under which a new cause of action for damages resulting from unlawful invasion of privacy was recognised. This right has two aspects which are but two faces of the same coin (1) the general law of privacy which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy and (2) the constitutional recognition given to the right to privacy which protects personal privacy against unlawful governmental invasion. In recent times, not to say, this right has acquired a constitutional status. As far as the freedom of press is concerned, it flows from the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). But the said right is subject to reasonable restrictions placed thereon by an existing law or a law made after the commencement of the Constitution in the interests of or in relation to the several matters set out therein. Decency and defamation are two of the grounds mentioned in Clause (2). Law of Torts providing for damages for invasion of the right to privacy and defamation and Sections 499/500 I.P.C. are the existing laws saved under Clause (2). But what is called for today – in the present times – is a proper balancing of the freedom of press and said laws consistent with the democratic way of life ordained by the Constitution.
With respect to first issue, Court says that the right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a “right to be let alone”. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent – whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.
The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. However, in the interest of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media.
There is yet another exception to the aforesaid rule – indeed; this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (2) above. It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the power to punish for contempt of court and the Parliament and Legislatures protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this rule.
Now, in relation to the second issue, Court referred to the famous case of New York Times v. United States [1971] 40 U.S. 713, popularly known as the pentagon papers case, and held that no such prior restraint or prohibition of publication can be imposed by the respondents upon the proposed publication of the alleged autobiography of ‘Auto Shankar’ by the petitioners. This cannot be done either by the State or by its officials. In other words, neither the government nor the officials who apprehend, that they may be defamed, have the right to impose a prior restraint upon the publication of the alleged autobiography of Auto Shankar. The remedy of public officials/public figures, if any, will arise only after the publication and will be governed by the principles indicated herein. That apart, court did not express any opinion about the right of the State or its officials to prosecute the petitioners under Sections 499/500 I.P.C. This is for the reason that even if they are entitled to do so, there is no law under which they can prevent the publication of a material on the ground that such material is likely to be defamatory of them.
As far as third issue is concerned, court observes that it is not claimed before it that Auto Shankar had requested or authorised the prison officials or the Inspector General of Prisons, as the case may be, to adopt appropriate proceedings to protect his right to privacy. If so, the respondents cannot take upon themselves the obligation of protecting his right to privacy. No prison rule is brought to the Court’s notice which empowers the prison officials to do so. Moreover, the occasion for any such action arises only after the publication and not before, as indicated hereinabove.
HELD:-
It is held in the case that the right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. So far as the government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them. Moreover, there is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit, or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/media. The principles above mentioned are only the broad principles. They are neither exhaustive nor all-comprehending; indeed no such enunciation is possible or advisable. This right has to go through a case-by-case development. The concepts dealt with herein are still in the process of evolution.
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