LIMITED POWER OF HIGH COURTS/TRIBUNALS TO DO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENTAL...

LIMITED POWER OF HIGH COURTS/TRIBUNALS TO DO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENTAL ENUIQRIES AND/OR PROCEEDINGS

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LIMITED POWER OF HIGH COURTSTRIBUNALS TO DO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENTAL ENUIQRIES ANDOR PROCEEDINGS
LIMITED POWER OF HIGH COURTSTRIBUNALS TO DO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENTAL ENUIQRIES ANDOR PROCEEDINGS

Aapka Consultant Judgment Series- In this series, we are providing case analysis of Landmark Judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K. Chopra

AIR1999SC625, (1999)1SCC759, [1999]1SCR117

Hon’ble Judge/Coram: Dr. A.S. Anand, CJI., V.N. Khare, JJ.

Date of Decision: 20.01.1999

FACTS;-

The respondent was working as a Private Secretary to the Chairman of the Apparel Export Promotion Council, the appellant herein. It was alleged that on 12.8.1988, he tried to molest a woman employee of the Council, Miss X (name withheld by Court) who was at the relevant time working as a Clerk-cum-Typist. A written complaint was also filed with Director (Personnel) to this effect. Consequently, the respondent was placed under suspension vide an order dated 18th August, 1988. A charge-sheet was served on him to which he gave a reply denying the allegations.

Director of the Council, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges framed against the respondent and he after considering the documentary and oral evidence and the circumstances of the case arrived at the conclusion that the respondent had acted against moral sanctions and that his acts against Miss X did not withstand the test of decency and modesty. He, therefore, held the charges levelled against the respondent as proved. The respondent, thereupon, filed Writ Petition No. 352 of 1995 in the High Court, challenging his removal from service as well as the decision of the Staff Committee dismissing his departmental appeal.

The learned Single Judge allowing the Writ Petition opined “that…. the petitioner tried to molest and not that the petitioner had in fact molested the complainant.” The appellant being aggrieved by the order of reinstatement filed Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court and Division Bench dismissed the appeal agreeing with the findings of the single bench. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench, the employer-appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

ISSUE;-

 1. Whether the High Court or Tribunal has any jurisdiction to interfere with the disciplinary matters and punishment imposed by Departmental authorities?

JUDGMENT;-

The High Court appears to have over-looked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable.

The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities.

Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though Judicial Review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial Review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Further, Judicial Review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court while exercising the power of Judicial Review must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the Administrative Authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Administrative Authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority.

The Supreme Court further held that the material on the record, thus, clearly establishes an unwelcome sexually determined behaviour on the part of the respondent against Miss X which was also an attempt to outrage her modesty. Any action or gesture, whether directly or by implication, aims at or has the tendency to outrage the modesty of a female employee, must fall under the general concept of the definition of sexual harassment. The evidence on the record clearly establishes that the respondent caused sexual harassment to Miss X, taking advantage of his superior position in the Council.

Court in this connection referred to the famous case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR1997SC3011, and international instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman, 1979 (“CEDAW”) and the Beijing Declaration, and held that the observations made by the High Court to the effect that since the respondent did not “actually molest” Miss X but only “tried to molest” her and, therefore, his removal from service was not warranted rebel against realism and lose their sanctity and credibility. In the instant case, the behavior of respondent did not cease to be outrageous for want of an actual assault or touch by the superior officer. In a case involving charge of sexual harassment or attempt to sexually molest, the courts are required to examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by insignificant discrepancies or narrow technicalities or dictionary meaning of the expression “molestation”.

They must examine the entire material to determine the genuineness of the complaint. The statement of the victim must be appreciated in the background of the entire case. Where the evidence of the victim inspires confidence, as is the position in the instant case, the courts are obliged to rely on it.

HELD;-

The act of the respondent undoubtedly amounted to sexual harassment of Miss X and the punishment imposed by the appellant did not warrant any interference by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. Thus, for has been said above the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the punishment as imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Departmental Appellate Authority of removal of the respondent from service is upheld and restored.

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